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ABSTRACT 
 
Client-side project managers face challenges in motivating project organisations to 
pursue exceptional design and construction performance. One approach to improving 
the motivation of project organisations is by offering a financial incentive reward for 
the achievement of voluntary performance standards above the minimum required 
standard. However, little investigation has been undertaken into the features of a 
successful incentive system as a part of an overall procurement strategy. In response 
to a lack of information available to client-side project managers tasked with the 
initial design of an incentive system, the paper explores motivation under a successful 
incentive and identifies key learnings for client-side project managers to consider 
when designing incentives. Our findings are based on the results of a large Australian 
case study which is interpreted against a conceptual framework based on both 
economic and psychological perspectives of motivation. The results suggest that 
motivation towards incentive goals is influenced by the value the project organisations 
place on the incentive reward as a commercial opportunity to increase their profit 
margins. However, perhaps more important are the relationship management 
processes that promote commitment to the project; and pride in the achievement of 
project goals. In the case study, these processes intensified the direct motivational 
effect of the incentive reward on offer. The findings also highlight the importance of 
ensuring that incentive goals and performance measurement processes remain relevant 
to the organisations throughout a project to continuously encourage motivation under 
changing project conditions.    
 
 
Keywords: construction projects, contracts, financial incentives, motivation, 
stakeholders.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contractual arrangements between construction clients and contractors are 
confrontational, reflecting considerable mistrust and leading to high contractor 
premiums to cover significant risk levels (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003). More effective 
  2
use of contracting options such as financial incentives can improve the balance 
between the allocation of risk and reward for performance gains (Howard et al., 
1997). A key objective of incentive contracting is to provide the opportunity for 
contractors to earn additional profit for higher performance (Bower et al., 2002).  
Generally, financial incentives aim to align the motivations of interdependent project 
stakeholders within a temporary project organisation. This is achieved through client 
gain-sharing, that is, by providing the contractor and/or consultants a share in the 
client’s success from the project. 
 
Financial incentives can be combined with any type of base construction contract and 
can be designed to reward the achievement of an infinite range of project objectives. 
Generally, incentives motivate a contractor by: 
 
 the method of payment of the contract price, which encourages the contractor 
to meet cost objectives, where overruns or delays will cause the contractor 
additional expense. Lump sum contracts penalise the contractor if fixed costs 
increase, as profit margins are diminished (Levine and Rickman, 2000) 
 a profit sharing (cost-plus) incentive arrangement, where the actual cost 
savings can be distributed between the client and the contractor in 
predetermined ratios (Arditi and Yasamis, 1998).  
 a performance bonus for meeting performance targets based on one or more 
client goals (Bower et al., 2002). 
 
Although, penalties can act as a strong motivator to prevent failure to comply with the 
contract conditions, to ensure that an adversarial relationship does not develop 
between the contracting parties, the incentive systems should focus on positive 
incentives, rather than penalties (Lahdenpera & Koppinen, 2003). Another argument 
in favour of the balanced use of positive incentive systems is that penalties will only 
encourage a contractor and/or consultant to deliver the minimum contract 
specification, where positive incentives aim to encourage performance above the 
minimum.  
 
A key objective of financial incentives is motivation towards cost containment. Cost 
containment rewards are one of the most widely used forms of incentive and can be 
applied to either fixed price, or modified cost reimbursable (cost-plus) contracts, 
depending on how the incentive is structured (Russell, 2003). Generally, under a cost-
plus incentive arrangement, the client’s target cost is introduced into a reimbursable 
contract and acts as the fulcrum around which the cost containment mechanism is 
driven, where savings achieved below the target cost are split between the contractor 
and client based on a predetermined share profile (Broome & Perry, 2002). The aim of 
this arrangement is to motivate the contractor and client to work together to minimize 
actual costs, as the contractor is able to maximise their profit margin by sharing the 
benefits of reduced project cost, and the client is motivated to minimize the total cost 
paid out (Broome & Perry, 2002). 
 
One of the most common forms of financial incentive is a performance bonus which 
can be integrated into a wide range of contract types, including standard lump sum 
and cost reimbursable contracts. Simply, performance bonus incentives aim to 
motivate the contractor by providing them with a financial bonus that is additional to 
their prescribed fee for exceeding minimum acceptable levels of performance 
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(Washington, 1997). Generally, performance is evaluated ex ante and the reward is 
distributed from a separate client bonus pool specified at the start of a project. As the 
financial incentive is drawn from a separate bonus pool, there is a wide range of 
performance areas that can rewarded, including schedule, environmental, quality, 
safety and design performance targets. However, important to the success of bonus 
incentives are specific, mutually agreed and measurable targets. If the output 
deliverables cannot be well defined, then an incentivised contract should not be 
pursued (HM Treasury, 1991).The down-side to such arrangements is that they can be 
time consuming to establish goals and benchmarks; and measurement processes need 
to be clearly defined and specified to prevent ambiguity.  
 
Although positive financial rewards offer potential to promote motivation towards 
incentive goals, they can be challenging to design and implement.. A key 
consideration for client-side project managers (referred to henceforth as ‘client 
managers’) in the context on a construction project is how the bonus or profit sharing 
reward will be distributed, that is to say, who are the reward recipients and will the 
reward be fairly distributed to those who have contributed to the performance gains? 
To effectively assess the optimal balance, client managers need to consider the 
possibility of individual- and/or team-based incentives and how performance will be 
measured across the various vertical and horizontal levels in a project.  
 
This challenge is further compounded by the one-off nature of construction projects 
and the ‘blurring of the lines’ of performance contribution due to the high levels of 
task interdependency. The construction product supply chain is commonly 
characterised by disjointed relationships between contracting parties (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004), where a large team is brought together on a one-off basis. As 
such, there can be limited scope to build cohesive team relationships over time. As a 
project can be viewed as a temporary organisation with its own social system (Gareis, 
2008), the dynamics and social complexity between construction stakeholders provide 
further challenges for client managers when designing an incentive mechanism.  
 
The ability of a social system to provide constructive dynamics in such a complex 
environment is influenced on its ability to develop complexity of its own in areas such 
as project organisation, culture and context dimensions (Gareis and Huemann, 2008). 
These issues suggest that client managers tasked with the initial design and 
implementation of incentives require a clear understanding of not only the incentive 
mechanism, but also the organisational and social context in which it is implemented. 
Consideration must be given to the incentives interaction with other procurement 
initiatives and the social and productive repercussions of its differential impact across 
the supply chain. For example, what happens if contractors are rewarded, but 
subcontractors are not?.  
 
Although the design of incentive systems is generally context dependent, client 
managers can benefit from the development of broad guidelines on how to incorporate 
incentives in their projects and how procurement initiatives can support their incentive 
design – to improve the effectiveness of the project organisation to meet incentive 
objectives.  
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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The previous section highlighted the challenges faced by construction client managers 
when designing incentive systems. Despite these significant challenges, little 
information is available to managers on what should be considered when designing 
financial incentives as a part of an overall procurement strategy. Arguably, there is a 
general assumption in the construction management literature that financial incentives 
automatically promote motivation with little regard to the context in which they are 
applied. However, research undertaken by Bresnen and Marshall (2000) shows that 
reliance primarily on extrinsic rewards such as incentives as a motivator can be 
construed by contractors and consultants as a ‘calculative’ approach, where such 
organisations are deemed to be motivated by short-term economic self-interest. In 
response, the findings stress the importance of understanding the limits of financial 
rewards to generate more intense forms of motivation and suggest the overall 
procurement approach needs to be complementary to the reward’s intention, although 
Bresnen and Marshall provide little detail about how this might be achieved. This 
paper responds to this gap in the literature by exploring what supporting mechanisms 
and incentive design configurations may produce a well-rounded approach to 
promoting team motivation towards voluntary project goals.  
 
Given the lack of research into the impact of incentives on motivation in construction, 
a conceptual framework was developed, based on theoretical insights, to identify the 
‘motivation drivers’ that impact on incentive goal motivation. By identifying these 
drivers, conclusions can be drawn about the impact of financial incentives on 
motivation and the types of project initiatives that should be considered by client 
managers when designing incentives as a part of an overall procurement approach. 
 
The case study interprets the motivation drivers according to a conceptual framework 
developed by Rose (2008). This framework represents the first time that both 
economic and psychological perspectives of motivation have been integrated to 
investigate financial incentives in a project-based environment. Figure 1 below 
provides a summary of the main features of the model. 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework Summary - Motivation on Construction Projects 
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According to the conceptual framework, project-based motivation towards voluntary 
incentive goals is determined by the features of (i) the financial incentive design and; 
(ii) the supporting procurement initiatives. Within these features lie specific 
motivation drivers that can be uncovered by exploring two broad motivation 
indicators developed from a review of the organisational motivation literature – (1) 
goal commitment and (2) organisational justice.  
 
These two indicators were used to identify the motivation drivers that impacted on the 
effectiveness of the financial incentive mechanism and the related procurement 
initiatives. In the case of this research, the first indicator, goal commitment 
(Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987) refers to the sustained determination and motivation to 
try for the performance goal associated with the incentive. Key antecedents of goal 
commitment are those that impact on the attractiveness of goal attainment and those 
that impact on the expectancy of goal attainment (Hollenbeck and Klein, 1987). Thus, 
positive drivers linked to this indicator improved the attractiveness of goal attainment 
and the stakeholders’ expectancy that incentive goals could be achieved.  
 
The second broad indicator, organisational justice, relates to the fairness of 
compensation systems for work performed.  Simply, justice theories can predict how 
groups may behave based on the perceived levels of fairness in an organisational 
environment. Key antecedents of organisational justice (Colquitt, 2001) are those that 
impact on 1) distributive justice, or the fairness of the reward on offer relative to the 
effort required to achieve; 2) procedural justice, or the fairness and transparency of 
procedures linked to incentive distribution decisions; and 3) interactional justice, or 
the underlying treatment and communication processes between project stakeholders, 
influencing mutual trustworthiness. These framework constructs represent a 
theoretical contribution to the construction management literature and proved 
instructive during the empirical phase of this project-based research. Rose (2008) 
provides further information on the theoretical background to the framework. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
A case study methodology was chosen to explore the research question: ‘What are the 
specific project drivers that impact on motivation towards voluntary financial 
incentive goals?’ This was seen as the best method given the complexity of project 
environments, and the need for in-depth understanding of the dynamics surrounding 
project-based motivation in order to effectively scope and identify drivers. This case 
study method promised to result in more valid and reliable findings than a broader 
quantitative approach. The case study presented in this paper was selected in a 
purposive manner, as it represents an example of the successful design and 
implementation of a financial incentive system as part of the overall project 
procurement approach. 
 
Case study findings were triangulated across the following data sources: semi-
structured face-to-face interviews, project and contractual documentation (including 
project briefs and minutes from meetings), industry publications, and a site visit. 
Extensive preliminary data were collected, which helped shape the questions asked 
during the interviews, as did the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1. The 
interviewees comprised eight senior managers; two from each of four key stakeholder 
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types (client, head contractor, consultants and subcontractors) who were heavily 
involved in the procurement and delivery of the case project. All interviews were in-
person and ranged from 60 to 90 minutes duration, based on structured and un-
structured questions. Raw interview data was analysed using content analysis. This 
involved manually aggregating and categorising responses from the interview 
transcripts and the secondary data to identify the key motivation drivers. The 
identification and refinement of driver categories was achieved by inductive coding. 
The primary data amounted to approximately 8,000 words contained in interview 
transcripts. The coding process involved interpretation of each interviewee’s transcript 
and each coding category was revised and refined until clear lines could be drawn 
between the motivation drivers. Initially, key themes associated with the broad 
motivation indicators were categorised into features of (i) the financial incentive 
design and; (ii) the supporting procurement initiatives. Once all project data had been 
allocated in this way, each theme was revisited and driver patterns were refined. 
Distinct patterns were separated into coding categories and allocated motivation driver 
labels. The goal was to define coding categories that captured the breadth of interview 
experience, whilst limiting the categories to key concerns. 
 
Care was taken to identify driver categories that covered all instances, were limited in 
number and were mutually exclusive. Due to the subjective nature of content analysis, 
an ‘expert panel’ was formed to test content analysis accuracy and ensure inadvertent 
bias was minimized. The category allocations of the three expert panel members 
reflected over 80% accuracy, providing evidence of the reliability of the coding.  
 
 
CASE PROJECT DETAILS 
 
The project involved the design and construction of a large-scale extension to a 
convention centre situated in the central business district (CBD) of Adelaide, South 
Australia.  The original budget for this project was approximately AU$85 million 
(increased to AU$92 million near the conclusion of the project). This was a landmark 
building project for the state government client, as the upgraded centre was expected 
to significantly contribute to the state’s economy.  
 
The project involved increasing the capacity of an existing convention centre by 
110%, providing approximately 7,000 square metres of new multipurpose exhibition, 
banqueting and pre-function facilities. The project site covered more than 1.2 hectares 
with a total building floor space of more than 21,000 square metres. The centre was 
designed to meet new multi-venue operational requirements, based on international 
convention centre standards and to accommodate more than 6,600 guests with 
undercover parking for 1,350 vehicles. The duration of the project was approximately 
22 months, from 1999 to 2001.  
 
A major goal of the project was to achieve the target completion date, as the client had 
made a commitment to host a major international convention in the new venue in late 
2001. Other project goals included meeting all functionality and design requirements 
set out in the project brief (including environmental and safety goals), defects-free by 
completion date, limiting errors and omissions in construction documentation, 
minimising industrial disputes, minimising injuries and meeting the client budget.  
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The general procurement approach was a Managing Contractor – Construction 
Management (MC-CM) arrangement. This was the first time a “relationship-based” 
MC-CM procurement approach had been used by the South Australian Government.  
They chose this approach because it allowed them complete control over the design. It 
also allowed them to manage construction costs through variation payments to the 
managing contractor and consultants. The disadvantage of this form of control was 
that the client took on the majority of the cost risks associated with the design (and 
design discrepancies) and construction. It was expected that, as the managing 
contractor was appointed under a fee arrangement to provide input into the design 
process and manage the construction trade packages, it would improve the 
constructability of the design, potentially decreasing design-construction integration 
risks.  
 
The procurement approach also included a comprehensive relationship management 
process. This aimed to further mitigate the design and construction risks taken on by 
the client, through closer integration of the project team (the managing contractor and 
consultants were directly contracted to the client throughout the project) and improved 
decision-making and problem resolution processes. It also established shared project 
goals against which performance could be assessed.  
 
The management structure was a “construction management” arrangement, with 
managing contractor and key subcontractors involved in design development and 
documentation. A unique feature on this project was the abolition of the traditional 
hierarchical structure. A ‘round table’ approach saw key representatives from each 
project organisation form an Integrated Management Team (IMT) and Project Control 
Group (PCG). There were monthly IMT and PCG meetings, where open and honest 
communication was encouraged, in an equitable environment. The IMT and PCG 
were established after the managing contractor was appointed, near the end of the 
schematic design stage, under a price and non-price criteria selection model. The IMT 
involved senior executive representatives, while the PCG involved management 
representatives from the client, end-users, cost manager and consultant and managing 
contractor organisations. The IMT reported directly to the government minister 
responsible for the project, while the PCG reported to the IMT. Any issues that could 
not be resolved by the PCG were referred to the IMT. 
 
The managing contractor and early key subcontractors were brought into the design 
process early, during design development and documentation, to fast track the 
commencement of the construction stage and improve constructability.  A relationship 
consultant was appointed during the project’s conceptual stage to establish and 
formalise the management structure and facilitate relationship workshops and ongoing 
relationship coaching. This approach aimed to foster team commitment to the project 
goals. All project parties were contractually obliged to ‘act in good faith’. 
 
The financial incentive system was intended to reward the contractor for efficiently 
managing the client’s risks, above their standard construction management fee. The 
client did not wish to include risk penalties such as liquidated damages, which they 
saw as contradictory to relationship management principles. The positive 
performance-based incentive aimed to reward three main areas of project 
performance: innovation contribution, contingency savings and ready-for-use 
completion. As a part of the “value strategy”, a financial incentive was offered to the 
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managing contractor to seek innovative value-adding design and construction options. 
The managing contractor could propose innovations that would achieve cost-savings 
and/or program savings while preserving functionality and quality. The innovation 
would then be approved by the client representatives and the net benefit of the 
innovation would be shared on the basis that: 
 
 50% was placed in a managing contractor’s program and cost savings 
incentive pool 
 50% was retained by the client to reinvest in the project. 
 
As the client managers needed to manage the government’s design and construction 
risks, they were motivated to promote innovative ideas and retain as much from the 
incentive pool as possible. The incentive was designed so that 50% of the accumulated 
incentive pool would be paid to the contractor if they achieved the ‘ready-for-use’ 
target completion date. However, if they failed to achieve this date, the contractor 
forfeited their portion of the accumulated incentive pool amount. By project 
completion, approximately AU$2 million in savings was achieved from innovations 
by the managing contractor. As the managing contractor achieved the ‘ready-for-use’ 
completion date, 50% of this (AU$1 million) was distributed to them as an incentive 
reward payment. 
  
Despite the overall success of the project in achieving the design and quality 
objectives, problems with budget overruns were experienced. It was initially believed 
that the project budget of AU$85 million was sufficient to achieve project objectives, 
including the design and construction program. However, during the project, the 
project team came to the consensus that due to rising ‘actual’ project costs attributed 
to a rising cost of construction across the building sector, it was unlikely that they 
would complete the project under the agreed specification within the original budget – 
despite robust management of design and construction. Joint team efforts to bring 
costs down were unsuccessful in capturing sufficient savings and it was agreed the 
original budget was inadequate to meet the scope of works. An open-book review of 
the project budget followed and the client agreed to an increase of approximately 
AU$7 million to the budget to avoid having to compromise on construction outcomes.  
 
The managing contractor and finishing subcontractors were involved in a special 
incentive arrangement - the ‘acceleration’ agreement, which was implemented late in 
the construction stage near the conclusion of the project, after the above problems 
were uncovered and it appeared unlikely that the project would be finished by the 
target completion date under the original budget. The client proposed the acceleration 
agreement (as a part of the revised budget) to fast-track project completion. The 
managing contractor and their subcontractors were required to complete the final 
scope of works by the target ‘ready-for-use’ completion date to receive the AU$1.2 
million bonus (plus management fees). The managing contractor was offered an 
AU$220,000 management fee to manage the final works; if they did not achieve the 
target completion date, they would forfeit their management fee. Also, the finishing 
subcontractors were offered extra payment to fast track completion of their trade 
packages. The completion date was achieved and the bonus was distributed between 
the contractor and finishing subcontractors, which allowed a scheduled international 
convention to be held. 
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By the conclusion of the project in late 2001, the project participants had achieved all 
of the project objectives, including the jointly-agreed revised project budget. The 
project team also produced a wide range of innovative design features that 
significantly improved the developed design in terms of building functionality and 
aesthetics. The project was considered a success by the project team, including the 
client, and this success was partly attributed to the financial incentive design, but also 
to the procurement initiatives that motivated the project team to strive for the project 
goals – maximising the impact of the incentive approach on team motivation. These 
initiatives are discussed in the following section.           
 
 
MOTIVATION DRIVERS 
 
The motivation drivers that were nominated by interviewees as contributing to the 
successful achievement of incentive goals on the project are examined here. These 
drivers emerged from the case interviews, which were based on background data and 
the two motivation indicators shown in Figure 1 – goal commitment and 
organisational justice. Again, following Figure 1, the identified drivers are discussed 
under two broad classes – (i) those motivation drivers that were associated with 
effective design of the incentive system, and (ii) those associated with the 
procurement initiatives that positively supported the incentive approach on the case 
project. Discussion of the motivation drivers below provides guidance for client 
managers in designing procurement approaches that incorporate similar financial 
incentive arrangements. Although the case study found no major negative project 
aspects arising from the procurement initiatives, negative aspects of the incentive 
design were raised and these are also discussed to aid in the design of optimal 
incentive systems in future projects of similar nature.  
 
Financial Incentive Design 
Although the amount of incentive reward on offer had a motivating effect, the design 
of the reward mechanism featured some elements that amplified this effect and some 
that constrained it. This suggests that incentives do not necessarily need to be large, 
but they do need to be strategically applied. For instance, the introduction of an 
acceleration agreement late in the construction stages of the project promoted goal 
commitment (cited by seven of the eight interviewees) by improving the expectancy 
the incentive could be achieved.  It also gave the managing contractor access to the 
innovation incentive pool, as the ‘ready-for-use’ completion date then became 
achievable. According to managing contractor representatives, the managing 
contractor was rewarded with their share of the innovation incentive pool through the 
introduction of the acceleration agreement, which “brought reality back” to the overly 
ambitious budget, restoring fairness in the incentive reward distribution, thus 
reinstating distributive justice.   
 
Despite the positive nature of the acceleration agreement as a part of the incentive 
design that promoted goal motivation, injustices in how the incentive reward was 
distributed across the project team and confusion over the ambiguous nature of the 
‘innovation contribution’ measurement had negative impacts on team motivation. 
Although those who had shared in the incentive reward valued it, seven of the eight 
interviewees perceived that the exclusion of the consultants from this incentive de-
motivated the consultants and resulted in less value delivered from innovation than 
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might otherwise have been the case. Also, according to five of the eight interviewees, 
the measurement of performance under the innovation incentive was unclear. 
According to these interviewees, there were disputes over how an “innovation 
contribution” was defined and how it was measured in terms of cost savings. This 
resulted in perceptions of procedural injustice. 
 
Procurement Initiatives 
Five project procurement initiatives were found to support the financial incentive 
approach applied in the case project. They are: 1) an equitable risk profile; 2) project 
organisation structure; 3) value-based tender; 4) relationship workshops; and 5) future 
work opportunities.   
 
1) Equitable risk profile  
According to the client and managing contractor representatives, the modified MC-
CM contract provided the framework for an equitable allocation of design and 
construction risk under the project conditions and the relationship management 
approach. These interviewees believed that the equitable contract risk profile 
promoted incentive goal commitment, where the client was willing to trust the 
managing contractor to manage their risks associated with program and budget 
overrun, rather than insisting they carry all design and construction risk. This allowed 
the managing contractor the financial flexibility to put resources into meeting the 
incentive goals and therefore improved their expectancy that they could achieve these 
goals. These interviewees also believed that the project’s contract risk profile 
promoted trust and interactional justice, i.e. the managing contractor valued the 
client’s decision to share the construction risks under the collaborative culture of the 
relationship-based procurement approach.  
 
2) Project organisation structure  
According to five of the eight interviewees, the project’s organisation structure 
(realised through the IMT and PCG monthly meetings) was a positive motivation 
driver towards the achievement of the incentive goals. The project organisation 
structure was perceived to improve the team’s ability to control their performance, 
thus improving the expectancy that the project stakeholders could attain the incentive 
goals, promoting goal commitment. These interviewees also perceived that the 
Integrated Management Team and Project Control Group monthly meetings assisted 
the team in dealing justly with project issues such as the inaccuracies in the project 
budget. 
 
3) Value-based tender  
Seven of the eight interviewees said that selecting the managing contractor and 
subcontractors on a value-based multi-criteria tender selection process (including non-
price) promoted commitment to the incentive goals. According to these interviewees, 
this commitment was due to the recognition of, and respect for, their ability to perform 
in a high-risk project. They felt inherent obligations to prove the client had been right 
to select them, motivating them towards the key project goals (operationalised through 
the incentive system).  The emphasis placed on a value-based tender selection 
supported the relationship-based approach, where the project parties were partly 
selected for their demonstrated ability to embrace collaborative arrangements, and to 
select harmonious project team personnel on whom the client could rely to manage the 
project risks. 
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4) Relationship Workshops  
Seven of the eight interviewees stated that the relationship workshops after tender 
selection developed a collaborative team culture which helped them to achieve the 
incentive goals and to minimise the impact of the project budget deficits. This driver 
was directly attributed to an increase in the attractiveness of goal attainment, thus 
promoting goal commitment. The relationship workshops were also perceived to be a 
promoter of interactional justice, in that the client representatives were receptive to, 
and respectful of, the significance of the contractor’s role in the project and the 
importance in forming a close working relationship. The motivation induced through 
the project relationships was also promoted through the potential for future work 
opportunities and the desire to uphold reputation. 
 
5) Future work opportunities 
Another positive motivation driver was the potential for future work with the client 
(cited by five of the eight interviewees) and the importance placed on upholding 
reputation and market position in the government building sector. These 
representatives believed that this driver increased their incentive goal commitment, as 
the achievement of the project goals in a high-profile building project would improve 
their business reputation, potentially leading to future work opportunities, thus 
increasing the attractiveness of goal attainment.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
These results suggest that the client’s addition of the acceleration agreement near the 
end of the project reinvigorated motivation towards the incentive goals by improving 
the chances to receive the financial reward. This driver strongly impacted on the goal 
commitment and organisational justice indicators. Yet, there were perceived injustices 
in how the incentive was distributed (excluding the design consultants from the 
incentive distribution), and in the interpretation of ‘innovative contributions’ (ignoring 
design ideas). The case results suggest that overall motivation may have been 
improved if the incentive system had rewarded the entire design team for innovation 
contributions and not just the managing contractor. This finding emphasises the 
strength of team based incentives when it is difficult to define performance 
contribution from individual stakeholder organisations.   
 
Although there were negative aspects of the incentive system on the project, these did 
not critically effect performance, as innovative cost savings were identified and the 
‘ready-for-use’ completion date was achieved. The results suggest the reason for this 
was the dominance of positive drivers such as the introduction of an acceleration 
agreement, the equitable contract conditions and the relationship formed through the 
initial workshops. 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, motivation towards the incentive was critically supported by 
the: 
 
 flexible incentive arrangement and client’s responsiveness to the changing 
project conditions, which allowed the introduction of an acceleration 
agreement – significantly improving the reward participants’ chances to 
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achieve the ‘ready-for-use’ completion date and gain access to the innovation 
incentive pool 
 Managing Contractor (Construction Management) contract that was perceived 
to be equitable by the contractors, supporting the ethos of the relationship 
management approach 
 relationship management strategy that promoted collaboration and teamwork 
through the initial relationship workshops and the motivation induced by the 
potential for future work opportunities if the project was delivered successfully  
 open-book tender for the managing contractor and subcontractors, with the 
majority of selection based on non-price criteria; and 
 the ‘round table’ design and construction management structure established in 
the monthly IMT and PCG meetings. 
 
Figure 2 Case Project Motivation Drivers 
 
 
 
In the case project, motivation towards the incentive goals was strongly influenced by 
1) the value project stakeholders placed on the incentive reward as a commercial 
opportunity to increase their profit margins, and 2) the quality of the  project and 
relationship management processes that promoted commitment and loyalty to the 
project; and pride in the achievement of project goals. These processes intensified the 
direct motivational effect of the incentive reward on offer.  
 
The findings support the general argument that the effective design of a project in the 
early stages requires the establishment of technical project plans, but also recognition 
that the project is a complex social system influenced by relationships within an 
organisational setting (Garies, 2008). The framework employed to distil these findings 
represents advancement of knowledge in the field of construction project 
management. Prior to this research, there was a general misguided assumption that the 
use of incentives translates into heightened motivation regardless of the context of 
application (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). This assumption was rejected by the 
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authors and Figure 1 postulate the existence of motivation determinants within 
incentive design and associated procurement initiatives, which result in motivation 
drivers. Background literature review suggested the nature of such determinants and 
fieldwork was conducted to identify motivation drivers. Hence the research gap shown 
in Figure 1 has been filled. The results here indicate that motivation in a complex 
social organisation such as a construction project is not straightforward and is 
influenced by numerous vertical and horizontal organisational drivers. The 
identification of such drivers confirms the value of the conceptual framework and 
provides it with more detail, thus enhancing its policy value. 
 
In summary, client managers should focus on maximising the impact of financial 
incentives systems so that stakeholders genuinely value the financial reward on offer 
and the incentive goals are perceived as achievable. The results also emphasise the 
importance of situating the incentive within a complementary suite of interrelated 
project procurement initiatives that promote its positive nature in recognition of high 
performance. Without doing so, incentive recipients may perceive the incentive’s 
intention as calculative and potentially hostile under an unjust procurement approach. 
Future quantitative research is recommended to extend the validity of findings 
presented here and to shed further light on how to design incentives as a part of a 
broader construction procurement approach. In the meantime, this case study has 
filled a gap in the literature by providing one view of the drivers of motivation on 
construction projects. The study has also contributed to theory by confirming the 
value of the conceptual framework shown at Figure 1 to assist in understanding the 
nature of project motivation. The benefit of integrating both economic and 
psychological perspectives of motivation has been demonstrated for the first time in a 
construction project environment.  
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